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This paper arose from the work carried out for the Cullen/Uff Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems.
It is concerned with the problem of evaluating the beneﬁts of safety enhancements in order to avoid rare, but
catastrophic accidents, and the role of Operations Research in the process. The problems include both input values
and representation of outcomes. A key input is the value of life. This paper brieﬂy discusses why the value of life
might vary from incident to incident and reviews alternative estimates before producing a ‘best estimate’ for rail. When
the occurrence of an event is uncertain, the normal method is to apply a single ‘expected’ value. This paper argues
that a more effective method of representing such situations is through Monte-Carlo simulation and demonstrates
the use of the methodology on a case study of the decision as to whether or not advanced train protection (ATP)
should have been installed on a route to the west of London. This paper suggests that the output is more
informative than traditional cost–beneﬁt appraisals or engineering event tree approaches. It also shows that, unlike
the results from utilizing the traditional approach, the value of ATP on this route would be positive over 50% of
the time.
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Introduction
Operations Research (OR) is primarily concerned with
methods for analysing complex interactive systems. In its
early days, the beneﬁts of actions in uncertain and risky
situations was an important OR topic. Much of the work in
the area of defence, for example, tried to relate the costs of
proposals to the very uncertain outcomes. Kirby and
Capey1,2 give numerous examples from World War II of
analysis of uncertain and potential losses against uncertain
gains.
Following this pioneering work, however, risk analysis
largely became the province of engineers and valuation that
of economists. The important topic of how best to evaluate
risky situations was largely ignored, with a broad acceptance
of the ‘expected value’ approach within a cost–beneﬁt
framework. One notable exception was the work of Cook
et al,3 who use data envelopment analysis to develop
differing weights for beneﬁts such as saving life or limb
and inputs such as trafﬁc delay and contract cost.
This is not to say that methodological development has
been absent, but rather that OR has been lacking in
interdisciplinarity. The engineers have tended to concentrate
developing in interdisciplinarity on methods of minimizing
risk. Thus, Kornhauser et al,4 in an excellent paper on
transporting hazardous materials, write ‘there are several
key elements (in the decision)y volume, frequencyy their
quantiﬁcation requires economic considerations which are
not considered as part of the paper’.
Orringer et al,5 consider rail safety procedures in the
context of a ﬁxed maintenance budget. Interestingly, they
use Monte-Carlo simulation to show that safety beneﬁts can
be achieved by ignoring minor faults with limited potential
to cause accidents to enable the search vehicle to continue
looking for major faults. However, the costs and beneﬁts of
another vehicle are not examined.
In a more modern example, Barnet6 looks at the issue of
air safety and its future. The problems of dealing with risks
that are extremely rare is highlighted, but the current air
safety culture accepted without evaluation. As we discuss
later, the implicit extremely high value given to life on an
airplane contrasts sharply with that given on the motorway.
This paper is concerned with bridging the gap between
risk estimation and risk valuation in the problematic area of
catastrophic failure.
Background to the case
In 1989, Hidden7 conducted a public inquiry into a major
railway accident at Clapham Junction just south of central
London. He concluded that British Rail (BR) should
introduce automatic train protection (ATP) on a large
‘percentage of its network’ within 5 years, with a high
priority being given to densely trafﬁcked lines. ATP is a
complex and expensive system that uses track side transmit-
ters to vary the speed of the train depending upon line
conditions. Essentially, ATP would eradicate all accidents
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that occur as a result of a train passing a signal at danger,
commonly known by the acronym Signal Passed at Danger
(SPAD).
In BR itself, there was considerable unease that the costs
of installing the system appeared to exceed the likely
beneﬁts. As a consequence of the Government’s 1993
decision to privatize BR’s operations, ATP installation was
postponed. At that time, the BR board informed the Chief
Inspecting Ofﬁcer of the Railways that the ‘time factor in
installing ATP was adversely affected’ by the ‘tight ﬁnancial
situation and current uncertainty about future develop-
ments’. In 1995, the Director of Safety for the now privatized
Railtrack informed the Chief Inspecting Ofﬁcer that there
was no legal basis for Railtrack to provide ATP, if this were
not ‘reasonably practicable’.
A number of cost–beneﬁt-type studies suggested that ATP
was not cost effective, but, in recognition that some further
safety measures were required, in 1999 Railtrack8 elected to
adopt the cheaper Train Protection Warning System
(TPWS). It estimated that it would prevent around 65% of
SPAD-related accidents at around 20% of the cost of ATP.
However, following the Joint Inquiry into the Southall
and Ladbroke Grove accidents and in the light of the
adoption of European Directives on inter-operability,
Cullen9 recommended that Raitrack
(1) install a supplemented TPWS (TPWSþ ) on all high-
speed lines
(2) install ERTMS level 2 (ATP plus) on the key East Coast
Main Line, West Coast Main Line and Great Western
Main Line, and
(3) consider the extension of ERTMS level 1 (ATP) where
currently installed to cover all trains.
As important Cullen suggested a timetable for implemen-
tation.
In April 2002, a cross industry report (ERTMS10)
considered these recommendations. It concluded that only
ERTMS level 2 would be adequate for the UK rail system as
a whole or particularly because of capacity constraints
associated with level 1. They also argued that the accelerated
timetable suggested by Cullen would actually involve more
death as passengers transferred to the road. Owing to the
implementation of the ‘second best’ TPWS throughout the
system, the cost of an accelerated ‘enhanced’ scheme was
now put at d75 million per life saved. To make any ﬁnancial
sense of the better safety system, the capacity gains from
ERTMS level 2 were needed. Thus, despite ERTMS not
being available until 2008 at the earliest, the argument not to
follow Cullen’s recommendations was accepted by the
government.
It is not our purpose here to dispute whether this is indeed
the ‘best’ solution for the UK. However, there was a similar
conﬁdence in 1995 over not following the recommendations
of Hidden and, in particular, that not extending ATP to a
stretch of railway to the west of London between
Paddington and Didcot was the ‘best’ decision.
Two serious crashes later, that decision looked seriously
erroneous.
This paper is primarily concerned with the debate about
the use of cost–beneﬁt analysis (COBA) in these situations,
the limitations of the analysis and the development of
improved analytic methods.
Problems with former analyses
The formal analyses of safety-related projects have, in
general, been uncritically framed within the context of a
cost–beneﬁt model. In their simplest form, these models
estimate the cost of a project, investment or regulation
narrowly to those who undertake it, and contrasts these costs
with the beneﬁts that would result in terms of injuries or
fatalities avoided, years of life added, etc. The principal
problem with simplistic cost–beneﬁt approaches, in the
context of rail safety, is that they do not account for a
number of issues that arise from the nature of risky events,
such as individual and societal risk perception, differences in
expert and lay risk assessment or even the often catastrophic
nature of accidents. Indeed, the potential cost of catastrophes
was explicitly excluded from the cost–beneﬁt calculations of
ATP because there was no agreed method of treatment.
What is presented here is an alternative approach to
assessing the validity of rail safety projects, which does take
into account the often catastrophic nature of rail and
transport accidents. In addition, we seek to consider the
costs and beneﬁts to society as a whole and to utilize values
that more accurately reﬂect the values of those affected by
rail disasters. We illustrate our approach by comparison
with previous studies of the extension of ATP on the
Paddington–Didcot line, which concluded that investment
was not cost effective. Before presenting our model, we will
brieﬂy discuss some of the concerns that have driven us to
develop an alternative model.
Risk perception and the framing of risk
Research by Morgan11 and other comparable studies (eg,
Margolis12 and Carthy13) suggest that individuals have a
preference for avoiding disastrous outcomes, as well as
outcomes that affect those who had to expose themselves to
a risk that they could not mitigate. Individuals value a
reduction of those risks to which groups of individuals are
unavoidably, or involuntarily, exposed more highly than the
reduction in risk that occurs to those who deliberately seek
or actively contribute to a risk. Thus, risks occurring in
mining, offshore oil and gas production and passenger air
travel would, by most individuals, be assigned a higher
priority than accident reduction in the context of certain
sports activities. Meanwhile, the a priori willingness of
individuals to engage in a risky activity differs widely. As a
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result, social risk assessments depend largely on framing,
which makes risk comparisons inherently difﬁcult. To give
an example, the fact that many people engage in far riskier
activities than rail travel does not imply that existing risk
levels in rail transport are tolerable and/or that society
should disinvest in rail safety.
The implication of this is that, if the COBA approach is
utilized in a transport safety context of a different, higher
than the ‘average’ value of life should probably be utilized in
recognition of both risk aversion of customers and the
catastrophic nature of the events.
Validity of COBA
The fact that, in the context of a privatized rail industry,
investments in passenger safety compete directly with the
economic interests of the operators as well as other potential
consumer interests in speed and value for money makes it
essential that the assumptions on which COBA are based
mirror both the nature of accidents and that of social
preferences as closely as possible. In the past, these concerns
have led some academics to oppose the use of COBA in the
context of health- or environment-related investments.
Kelman14 noted three principal objections to the use of
COBA. Firstly, that there were areas of environmental and
health and safety regulation where a certain course of action
is justiﬁed, even if beneﬁts do not outweigh its costs.
Secondly, that there are often good reasons to oppose efforts
to put dollar values on non-marketed beneﬁts and costs.
Lastly, that there were occasions where society would
explicitly wish not to monetise beneﬁts or costs, because it
places a superior importance on other issues.
While Kelman’s critique has some validity, it is essentially
limiting. In our view, any decision requires bringing together
the inputs and outputs, and this requires aggregation on a
common scale utilizing some weighting mechanism. Utility-
type weights have advocates but, monetary weights, if they
can be used, have the major advantage of direct transfer-
ability between projects.
The major problems with conventional approaches to
COBA is that they have often been applied mechanically
(and narrowly) without taking account of the true nature of
risky events (such as the occurrence of disasters) nor the
different value weights that will arise in different contexts. In
this context, however, central to any evaluation is the value
of life.
The value of life
Today, the methodology appropriate for the valuation of a
human life, both in terms of its size and derivation, is still a
matter of doubt. Conventional methods for the valuation of
life range include: a discounted estimate of future earnings;
an estimate of the discounted loss accruing to others; and an
estimate of society’s past valuation of human life implicit in
public initiatives aimed at reducing loss of life and a survey
estimate of an individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a
reduction in the risk of death.15
While the WTP method today enjoys the broadest
acceptance, there are different views as to how WTP is best
studied. According to Viscusi,16 these can be grouped into
‘labour market studies of the value of life’, those based on
‘tradeoffs outside the labour market’ and ‘value of life
estimates based on survey evidence’. Although studies
continue to be published following all three approaches,
labour market-based approaches appear to have gained the
widest acceptance, while survey-based approaches have
become less popular.
Criticisms of WTP approaches have focused on two
points, namely the moral problems underlying the WTP
approach, and secondly, the inaccuracy of WTP estimates.
As concerns the moral dimension of WTP studies, Kelman14
has suggested that, in taking guidance for public decisions
from private decisions, this approach falsely assumes that
there should be no difference between private behaviour and
the behaviour we display or desire in public life. Rather,
Kelman suggests that should our society provide us the
occasion to display a reverence for life that we espouse, but
do not always display. In our view, this implies that if a
society were to value collectively a certain outcome, such as
having proﬁtable, privatized railways invest in, and ensure,
safe travel, it may wish to express this in a higher than
otherwise detected valuation of human life.
Another signiﬁcant problem concerns the inaccuracy of
WTP estimates. Jones-Lee17 presents an early meta-analysis
of existing studies (labour market-based and others) and
revealed preference-based estimates of human life to range
from d410 000 to d795 000. (All values in this section have
been standardized to 1987 d Sterling.) Questionnaire-based
estimates, meanwhile, showed an even broader divergence
from d50 000 to d8 250 000.
In terms of magnitude, the more recent survey of labour
market-based WTP by Viccusi16 essentially supports Jones-
Lee’s earlier ﬁndings. Thus, for studies post-1985, Viscusi
identiﬁed values of life ranging from d0.96 to £9.72 million,
an average valuation of human life of d4.4 million. Given
that the studies include a range of countries, a value of d2
million (equivalent to d3.3 million in 2000) suggested earlier
by Jones-Lee17 on the basis of UK studies would appear to
represent an appropriate estimate for the value of life.
The more recent WTP estimate of the value of life by
Jones-Lee18 of (d Sterling, 2000) 1.157 million, presented on
behalf of Railtrack at the Paddington Inquiry, was based on
a relatively small sample (n¼ 150). The fact that this
estimate would tend to contradict the cumulative evidence
suggested by other approaches and studies suggests that it is
not reliable.
Most recently, Cullen9 states that on the basis of value for
life estimates for road accidents and the clear measured risk
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aversion of rail passengers, BR and the HSE now use a
current value of life for passengers on railways of d3.22
million, d2 million in 1987 terms. We would also argue that
where the result is a ‘catastrophe’ (such as almost universally
applicable to airline accidents or nuclear incidents), this
value should be appreciably higher than the £1.34 million
suggested by Railtrack.
Estimation of the risk of an accident
Rail accidents occur for a variety of reasons such as bridge
collapses, rail distortion or even suicide. As highlighted
earlier, another major cause is when a driver has passed a
signal set at danger (a SPAD) and gone on to collide with
another train, hit buffers or derail at points.
The estimation of risk of a SPAD-based rail accident can
be approached from two directions. Where there are little or
no data on past incidents, it makes sense to capture any
subjective information that individuals hold about the
likelihood of any step that may lead to an accident. In this
way, it is possible both to identify the critical factors and to
obtain some, albeit subjective, estimate of the risk. In some
cases, some statistical probabilities can be attached to these
events that can contribute to accidents, but in most cases the
very limited observations make such estimates subject to
potentially a very wide error. This problem is magniﬁed
because each probability is part of a multiplicative chain, and
hence the resulting potential error can be extremely large.
Over the years, BR has invested heavily in identifying risk
critical elements using this Event Tree approach and has,
quite naturally, taken this forward as a forecast of the risk
(Modern Railways19) but without consideration of the very
low reliability of the estimate.
An alternative method of assessing the risk of a rail
accident is based on estimating the average number of
SPADs per annum for any section of line (from the SPAD
records), and then applying an appropriate ratio for SPADs
to accidents. This methodological approach follows the
suggestion by Rasmussen20 that where there are substantial
recorded experiences with accidents and where individual
probabilities of an event or fault tree are difﬁcult to
calculate, an ‘actuarial method’ based on accident probabil-
ities should be used. This approach poses a number of minor
problems as regards the applicability of national rates to
speciﬁc sections and the time period of collection, but does
have the signiﬁcant advantage of being based on a
sufﬁciently large number of observations. While this
approach is less precise it has the virtue of consistency. As
Kornhauser et al4 put it ‘a more reliable measure of risk can
be obtained from a less precise yet consistent analysis than
an analysis that is very detailed in parts but fraught with
data gaps in other parts’.
Concerns with the costing of catastrophic, multi-fatality
events in previous studies, were raised by the then
nationalized rail industry as early as 1994. Thus, section 6
of the BR ATP report noted that:
‘The largest number of fatalitiesy from ATP preventable
accidents was seven, at Paisley in 1979. But, it is all too easy to
envisage circumstances in which an ATP-preventable accident
could have a death toll an order of magnitude greater than
that. The analysis considered by the Board recognized this as a
crucial issue, but concluded that there seemed no ready way in
which it could be quantiﬁed’ (BR21 p 27).
However, if a catastrophe is assumed to be simply an
extremely unusual event with many fatalities (ie, above
seven), then the statement is not strictly accurate; it is
possible to obtain some estimate of the impact of a
catastrophe on COBA using Monte-Carlo simulation.
Applying the Monte-Carlo approach
The main feature of the Monte-Carlo approach is the
combination of a random number and a probability
distribution of an event. The event in this instance, an
accident, is assumed to have a Poisson distribution. This
distribution is based upon a single parameter, the mean, and
accidents generated by this distribution over a number of
years will have the same mean. The Poisson describes the
distribution of rare events and has been widely applied in the
areas of rail safety (eg, see Evans22). With the use of a
random number generator, the number of accidents in any
year can thus be simulated. The average of these will be the
mean of the distribution. If the accident rate is say 0.05, then
one accident would be expected to occur every 20 years.
Over a 25-year period, however, it is possible for there to be
no accidents at all or conversely three could occur in 1 year.
Monte-Carlo simulation views these as simply samples from
the complete range of possible alternatives.
If an accident is projected to occur, then the second
question is how serious will it be? A distribution of these
occurrences can be estimated from previous research and
past observation on the severity of accidents. By generating
more random numbers and mapping them to this distribu-
tion, casualty rates can be established that, when averaged
over many trials, replicate the casualty distribution, includ-
ing those rare catastrophes.
There is a set of random numbers for each year, and 25
such sets for the whole model (assuming a time horizon of 25
years), which constitute a ‘trial’. Since each combination is a
random sample, the outcome (eg the cost/beneﬁt ratio) is
equally a valid random sample from the range of all possible
outcomes. Each ‘trial’, with new sets of random numbers, is
another possible sample from these outcomes. As the results
are based on the underlying distributions, if sufﬁcient trials
are carried out, the results obtained will replicate the
likelihood at which these results occur in reality. The
appropriate number of trials is contentious. If the random
number generator is poor, then recycling can occur relatively
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quickly making runs of more than 150 simply repetitive.
However if, as in this case, the simulation is simple then any
inefﬁciencies from too many runs are balanced by the
possibility of covering a wider range of outcomes. In this
case, we chose rather arbitrarily runs of 1000.
An important feature of the approach is that an estimate
of the impact of a catastrophic event appears, together with
the likelihood of these type of results. By allowing for the
possibility of a multi-fatality accident, this model presents a
methodological superior alternative to event tree analysis,
which typically averages out fatalities over a number of years
and assesses their costs on that basis.
Our model is based upon two units of measurement,
accidents and resulting casualties. As outlined in the
following sections, beneﬁts are associated with the number
of casualties avoided. The model then takes the year-by-year
cash ﬂows and discounts them back to provide a net present
value (NPV) and reports the number of times in 1000 trails
beneﬁts exceed costs in addition to the mean, median and
standard deviation of these trials.
Casualty frequencies and rates
BR21 and WSAtkins23, with the modiﬁcations suggested by
Hendy24, enabled us to identify a mean accident rate.
Further data from BR,21 WSAtkins23 and AEA25 provided
us with enough data to deﬁne the probability distribution for
the size of any accident as given in Table 1. Casualties are
expressed in the form of fatality equivalents (FATs), where a
major injury is deﬁned as counting as 0.1 equivalent fatality
and a minor injury counts as 0.005 equivalent fatality (BR21).
To summarize, we can estimate the number of accidents in
a given year, the severity of which is expressed as a fatality
equivalent. This value can then be multiplied by the value of
life to obtain the cost of an accident. If ATP was installed,
the prevention of these accidents would represent a beneﬁt
that can then be offset against the cost of installation of the
ATP system. There are, however, a number of other factors
to be considered. Speciﬁcally, assumptions (or more
precisely estimates) have to be made regarding other matters
such as the discounting rate, asset life and social costs. These
are now brieﬂy discussed.
Other factors in the cost-beneﬁt study
The ﬁrst of the modelling assumption concerns the
discounting rate, that is, the rate at which future cash ﬂows
will be deﬂated to express them in consistent units of
currency. To avoid problems of forecasting inﬂation, these
are taken as real rates (ie, all projections and discount rates
assume zero inﬂation). A real discounting rate of 8% is a
well-known, and frequently used rate of return within the
rail industry. In the later years of the nationalized British
Rail, potential major investment projects were required to
show an 8% real rate of ﬁnancial return before approval
could be given.26 In today’s economy, however, there
seems little justiﬁcation for an 8% level and more justiﬁca-
tion for a 3% real rate of return, slightly higher than real
risk-free returns.
A second consideration is the length of time the ATP
installation will be offering beneﬁts, the planning horizon. If
maintenance costs are included, there is no reason to
presuppose that the system should not have a useful life in
the order of 25 years. Evans,27 for example, used a 29-year
planning horizon in his assessment of projections of
accidents and fatalities avoided by the ﬁtment of the TPWS.
Annual maintenance costs were assumed to be 10% of
construction costs.
Physical costs are deﬁned as the direct costs to the train
operating company and Railtrack of an accident. This will
include items such as rolling stock repair, infrastructure
renewal and lost revenues from ticket sales. Annex 7 of the
1994 BR ATP study (BR21) provides an estimate in 1994
prices of d4.2 million for a major accident (ie, one involving
loss of life) and d43K for a minor accident. As in the
approach adopted, both the number of accidents and
the severity of each accident are directly estimated, these
Table 1 Fatality equivalent frequency distribution
Class interval Mid point Frequency Probability Cumulative probability
0 to less than 0.1 0.00 400 0.8333 0.8333
0.1 to less than 1 0.55 24 0.0500 0.8833
1 to less than 2 1.5 25 0.0521 0.9354
2 to less than 3 2.5 12 0.0250 0.9604
3 to less than 4 3.5 3 0.0063 0.9667
4 to less than 5 4.5 3 0.0063 0.9730
5 to less than 10 7.5 10 0.0208 0.9938
10 to less than 25 17.5 2 0.0042 0.9980
25 to less than 50 37.5 1 0.0021 1.0000
Total 480
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BR ﬁgures (adjusted for inﬂation) can be directly attached
to accidents.
In the context of rail safety, any COBA must assess
whether the beneﬁts of such a measure would exceed the
costs for the public as a whole, not just for the rail operator.
Inclusion of these social costs recognizes that a valuation
should be placed upon events such as the delay, disruption
and the re-routing of journeys. Furthermore, it is important,
particularly with the current fragmented railway structure,
that an item headed social cost is included to ensure that an
appropriate ‘public’ perspective is adopted in the COBA.
Unfortunately, we were unable to ﬁnd any estimates of such
costs in the context of rail accidents. Clearly, therefore, any
evaluation of social costs is speculative in the extreme, but
examination of the expected delay resulting from minor and
major accidents suggested that social costs are likely to be a
minimum of some 10% of the physical costs of an accident.
Improvements in rolling stock design have reduced
casualties and may continue to do so in the future. Hence,
improvements should also be taken into account in any
appraisal. Atkins23 used an annual reduction rate of 0.77%,
and this is used in this example. On the other hand, it is also
clear that more people are using the railways. If more trains
run then the accident rate is likely to increase. If more
passengers are loaded on the same number of trains then the
casualties per accident will increase; likewise if trains are
travelling faster so that collision speeds increase, a greater
number of casualties could be expected. These effects are
likely to be as signiﬁcant, if not more signiﬁcant, than the
reduction in casualties via rolling stock improvement and
would logically be expected to work in the opposite
direction, that is, increase the likelihood of accidents and/
or casualties. Growth in passenger numbers has been one of
the few successes of privatization of the railways, with ﬁgures
increasing annually by over 4% nationally for the period
1996/1997 to 1999/2000 and over 6% per year for Thames
Trains, operator of the Paddington–Didcot line. Projection
of this level of growth over 25 years, however, is contentious,
although the Government’s 10-year plan projects a national
growth of 50% in passenger numbers over the next 10 years
(DETR28). Nevertheless, it is equally clear that to assume no
growth is invalid. Since there is a close relationship between
economic growth and travel, one approach is to apply the
projected long-term growth rate of 2.5% as the measure of
overall business growth.
Application
In this section, the results are discussed of applying the
methods, model and assumptions discussed earlier to the
installation of ATP on the Paddington to Didcot route. The
route-speciﬁc factors are the costs of installation and the
current level of SPADS. The latter has already been
discussed, and the former was taken from the COBA study
undertaken by Atkins.23
Using these ﬁgures, both statistically derived and assumed
values, the cash ﬂows for the project were simulated 1000
times. Table 2 reproduces these results for a number of
scenarios, Case 6 presents ﬁndings for what is deemed to be
the most likely scenario (in italics), while the remaining
columns give the average results for nine other cases using a
number of different assumptions identiﬁed in the rows, for
example, different discount rates or values placed on life.
These range from the least to the most favourable for the
adoption of ATP. The ﬁgures at the bottom under the
heading ‘Outcomes’ give a risk quotient. This is deﬁned as
the percentage (expressed as a probability) of times the
beneﬁts of implementation outweighed the costs, from the
Table 2 Monte-Carlo simulation, Cases 1–10, assumptions and results
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Assumptions
Discount rate (%) 8 8 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 2
Vol inﬂation (%) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.0
Value of life (dm) 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Social cost factor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Project life (years) 20 20 20 20 25 25 25 30 30 35
Physical costs (major) (dm) 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
Physical costs (minor) (dk) 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Casualty reduction (%) 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
Business growth (%) 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.0
SPADs per annum 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 10.68 10.68 10.68 10.68 10.68 10.68
Accidents/SPADs (%) 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Outcomes
Risk quotient 0.099 0.219 0.252 0.275 0.358 0.479 0.611 0.602 0.642 0.668
Mean value (dm) 6.36 2.25 0.95 0.31 3.16 10.83 25.22 30.50 33.37 42.26
Median value (dm) 8.68 7.44 7.18 6.83 4.03 0.63 6.95 8.43 8.99 11.86
Standard deviation (dm) 7.20 14.53 17.54 17.20 20.99 34.42 48.38 56.72 62.95 78.14
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1000 ‘sample values’ of outcome. The mean, median and
standard deviation of these sample values are also given.
Discussion
Decision making in risky situations inevitably has consider-
able complexity. The structuring and statistical methods of
OR utilized in this case are, it is contended here, extremely
valuable in generating appropriate information. However,
one additional problem that needs resolution is the appro-
priate objectives of the ﬁrms, safety bodies and government
regulators. A full OR study of this problem is required, but is
unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.
One suggested new criterion that could be employed is the
probability that beneﬁts will exceed costs, or as deﬁned
above, the risk quotient. Safety-conscious organizations,
that is, those that are risk adverse, would seek a small risk
quotient. In the context of rail safety, they would undertake
a safety-enhancing investment even if the risk quotient was
relatively low. Those with alternative priorities, on the other
hand, would use a higher risk quotient as the criterion.
Examining the results from a risk neutral position, that is, by
applying a simple criterion of 0.5, the decision to invest is
strictly marginal, 0.479.
The results also provide interesting contrasts with other
approaches. With high standard deviations, the mean and
median values provide poor forecasts of likely outcomes.
Nevertheless, as the median is less affected by extremes, its
values would be more in line with results using an event tree
approach. Thus, in our most likely scenario, Case 6, a
negative median value would correspond with a negative
evaluation using more traditional approaches. This would
lead to advocacy of non-investment in ATP.
We would argue, however, that there are considerable
dangers when basing judgements on an average value that
does not take into account extremities. In Case 6, the risk
quotient is marginal and the mean is strongly positive. We
believe that the reporting of results in this manner is far
more informative and transparent than earlier approaches.
The other results in the table highlight the critical areas to
be considered in terms of the assumptions. Ignoring the
SPAD rate, which technically should be directly observable,
the factors that have the strongest impact are the discounting
rate and the value of life. Perhaps surprisingly, the useable
life of the investment and the social costs have little
signiﬁcant impact over the feasible range.
Conclusions
The use of cost–beneﬁt analysis to analyse investment in
complex systems involving death and serious injury has not
been universally accepted. Quite naturally, putting a value
on a life or an arm arouses serious misgivings and the
problem of the trade-off between those who pay and those
who receive the beneﬁts is always a contentious issue.
However, in our view the decision maker always needs to
weigh objectives and establish the ability of alternative
strategies to meet these objectives. In the safety context, we
believe that COBA remains preferable to alternative
approaches such as multi attribute utility analysis not least
because the government accepts the approach. Correctly
conducted COBA provides direct useable, useful informa-
tion to decision makers.
However, because of the complexity of the problem and
the uncertainty surrounding so many of the assumptions and
values, sensitivity analysis is absolutely essential. In the case
of unlikely but costly events, this should involve a risk
analysis (Monte-Carlo simulation) so that under an agreed
set of assumptions the decision maker has information on the
likelihood of beneﬁts exceeding costs. In our view, OR has an
important complementary role to the work of economists
and engineers in helping determine objectives, in structuring
the problem and in conducting the risk analysis. It is to be
hoped that this paper and our work for the Cullen Inquiry
will lead to more involvement of OR teams, more adequate
analysis and, hopefully, less tragic accidents.
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